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THE NEW MINNESOTA IMPROVEMENT-ASSESSIENT
PROCEDURE (Chapter 398, Laws of 1953)
DE FOREST SPENCER, JR.*

The purpose of this Article is to propose answers to problems
which are likely to be encountered by officers and attorneys of
Minnesota municipalities' in proceedings under Chapter 398, Minnesota Session Laws of 1953 (now Chapter 429 of Minnesota Statutes of 1953).2 I have selected for treatment those problems,
whether strictly legal in nature or not, which seem to me to recur
most often in such proceedings. I will try throughout to deal with
these problems in the light of Minnesota statutes and decisional
law, drawing on decisions of other jurisdictions, or on treatises,
only when Minnesota decisions are lacking.
The chapter is one of those wonders of the world in statutemaking: a law specifically repealing a whole host of prior laws-in
fact, expunging no less than 58,2' pages of Minnesota Statutes3
Only one improvement-assessment law of general application to
villages and cities (other than lst-class cities) remains.4 The
effect of this wholesale repeal is reinforced by the provisions in
Minnesota Statutes, § 429.021 (3) (1953)' that "when any portion
of the cost of an improvement is defrayed by special assessments, the
procedure prescribed in this chapter shall be followed unless the
council determines to proceed under charter provisions..

. ."'

Since

§ 429.011(5) defines "improvement" as "any type of improvement
made under authority granted by section 429.021 of this chapter,"
*Member of the Minnesota Bar. The author hereby acknowledges the
valuable suggestions and criticisms made by Arthur B. Whitney, Jr., member
of the Minnesota Bar.
1. Whenever used in the text and footnotes, "municipalities" means all
2d, 3d and 4th class cities, villages, and boroughs, and some townships. See
Minn. Stat. § 429.011 (2) (1953).
2. Hereinafter referred to as "the chapter".
3. Previous enactments of improvement-assessment procedures for Minnesota municipalities generally embodied no repeals. Borgerding v. Freeport,
166 Minn. 202, 207 N. W. 309 (1926), portrays the resulting problems.
4. The sole survivor is Minn. Stat § 459.14 (1953), authorizing parking

facilities and the levy of assessments therefor in all cities and villages except
1st class cities. Counties and townships have their own improvement-assessment
procedures but the chapter applies to some townships. Minn. Stat. § 429.011
(2) (19535. Presumably, § 444.075 still authorizes the sewer improvements
therein described, using either the chapter or charter procedure. Quacre, what
(if any) are the local improvement powers of townships under Minn. Stat. §
368.01 (1949), as amended by Minn. Laws 1953, c. 462. This section apparently
should have been amended by Minn.Laws 1953, c. 398. However, most townships which in the past have levied assessments for improvements fall within
the definition of "municipalities" in Minn. Stat. § 429.011 (2) (1953).
5. All subsequent section numbers in the text and footnotes refer, unless
otherwise indicated, to Minnesota Statutes (1953).
6. See also § 429.111.
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and § 429.021 grants authority for making almost every type of improvement for which special assessments have traditionally been
levied, the result is that municipalities as defined by § 429.011(2)
must make such improvements, when they are to be financed wholly
or in part by the levy of special assessments, under either the chapter or under charter procedure.7 And since Minnesota villages, being governed by the general laws, 8 have no charters, and few existing city charter procedures are as good as the chapter's, probably
almost all city and village assessment improvements, except in firsi
class cities, should and will be made under the chapter.
This is a fortunate result, because the new law, drafted by a
committee of experts in municipal law and finance, and endorsed for
passage by the League of Minnesota Municipalities, provides a
simpler procedure and answers more questions than any of the
previous improvement-assessment statutes, with the exception of
the local improvement sections of the Village Code," from which
the new law mainly derives. It is also an advantage to have but one
uniform procedure for all city and village improvements. To municipal officers and attorneys, it means having to be familiar with only
one statute instead of several; and to bond dealers and investors,
it means absence of doubt as to the nature of the obligation of
municipal improvement bonds.
PRELIMINARY STEPS
Unless it has received a petition, the council will initiate the
improvement. In either event, its first step should be to ask the city
or village engineer for a report on the improvement as required by
§ 429.031(1). If the project still appears sound and desirable, but
is on a large scale, the council should consider whether its estimated
cost is within the financial capacity of the municipality. Some of the
relevant factors are:
(1) Cash on hand available for the improvement.
(2) Cost of other anticipated projects.
(3) Revenue-producing possibilities of the improvement and
other municipal utilities and enterprises.
(4) Assessed valuation of the municipality.
(5) Present municipal indebtedness.
7. The only possible exception to this result is in the case of Winona, the
only second-class city in the state operating under special law. See § 429.111.
S. § 412.901.
9. Minn. Stat. §§ 412.401 to 412.481 (1949), repealed by Minn. Laws
1953, c. 39S, * 13 (1).
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(6) Debt of overlapping taxing districts (such as the county
and school district).
(7) Estimated interest cost on the portion of the cost to be
borrowed.
(8) Present and future ability of the property area to be assessed to pay the assessments. 10
The evaluation of these factors, in relation to the feasibility of the
project, the method of allocating cost among assessments, taxes and
other revenues, the period over which the cost can be paid from each
of these sources, and the terms on which bonds can be sold in anticipation of such payments, is a specialized field in investment banking. Particularly if the project is relatively large and the municipal
officers have had little experience with such matters, it is desirable
to seek professional advice. All of the factors mentioned bear ultimately on the ability of the municipality's tax-payers and propertyowners to pay the necessary general taxes and assessments, so on
any big project it would also be desirable to have the village engineer draw up an estimate of the amounts of taxes and special assessments which will be required from various types of home-owners
and business concerns, and from those owning large undeveloped
tracts. At any rate, the taxpayers and property-owners will pretty
surely ask the council for such estimates at the outset.
When an expensive improvement is being planned, the average
amount of. general taxes which will have to be levied annually to pay
the portion of the cost not assessed should be checked to see that,
when added to other necessary annual tax levies, it does not push
the municipal tax levies up over the statutory per capita limitation."'
Violation of the per capita limitation could cause the municipal
officers to become personally liable for paying the contractor,1 2 or
could result in drastic cuts in operating fund tax levies.' 3 Fortunately, the per capita limitation is set so high that it is extremely un10. If part of the cost will be specially assessed, the statutory debt limit
is not a factor. §§ 429.091 (3) and 475.51 (4).
11. §§ 275.11 and 275.44-275.47. Unless the municipality can borrow the
cost of the improvement from its permanent improvement revolving fund or
another municipal fund, levying taxes and assessments to pay the cost of the
improvement normally implies that improvement bonds or warrants will be

issued under § 429.091, since the taxes and assessments are usually made collectible in installments. Section 429.091 (2) does not take all taxes levied to
pay improvement bonds or warrants entirely out from under the statutory per
capita limitation: it exempts from legal limitations only the deficiency levies

for improvement bonds when the tax levies first made for the improvement
prove insufficient. Cf. § 475.74. The statutory per capita limitation therefore
applies to the tax levies before deficiencies arise or are reasonably to be

anticipated.
12. § 275.27.
13. § 275.16.
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likely it will be exceeded by the average municipality even when
improvements are being planned on a large scale.' 4 Mill rate limitations are not much of a problem either; I feel it is safe to assert
that they do not in the usual case apply at all to general tax levies
to pay for improvements. 15 While special assessments are in theory
levied under the taxing power,'8 they are not "taxes" in the sense
7
in which that word is used in tax levy limitation provisions.'
If no engineering, legal or financial objections to the improvement remain, the council may proceed to call the formal hearing required by § 429.031(1). However, it may be advisable, if the improvement is of a controversial nature, or affects the whole municipality, to hold an informal public or mass meeting prior to the
formal hearing, for the purpose of explaining the improvement to
the general public, with talks by experts on the pros and cons.
While such an informal meeting does not take the place of the
formal hearing required by § 429.031 (1), it may disclose that there
is popular support for the project and thus facilitate the subsequent
legal steps, or possibly show that the project should be recast or
altered in scope. It would be improper for the council to go further
than such a preliminary meeting and actually expend public funds
on a propaganda campaign in favor of the improvement.'
Another step the municipality may take before holding the formal hearing is to prepare plans and specifications and advertise for
construction bids, as permitted by § 429.031(1). The opening of
bids might well be set for a date shortly before or coinciding with
that of the hearing, so that the hearing may be conducted in the
14. See State Governmental Research Bull., The Minnesota Tax Sys-

tem, Appendix D, 130-134 (May, 1948).
15. As to villages, see § 412.251. Subdivision I of § 412.251 puts improvement bond or warrant taxes outside the general 30 or 35 mill limitation,
since these are sinking fund taxes under § 475.61; subdivision 12 does the

same for improvement fund taxes levied under § 429.051, even when no bonds
or warrants are issued. As to cities, provisions of special and home-rule
charters should be examined. Usually the mill rate limitations are so stated
that they do not limit general tax levies for improvements. Cf. In re Delin-

quent Taxes in Polk County, 147 Minn. 344, 180 N. W. 240 (1920) (Crookston home-rule charter).

16. McComb v. Bell, 2 Minn. (Gil. 256) 295 (1858) ; Noonan v. Stillwater, 33 Minn. 198, 22 N. W. 444 (1885) ; cf. Stinson v. Smith, 8 Minn. (Gil.

326) 366 (1862) ; First Div. R. R. v. St. Paul, 21 Minn. 526 (1875) ; St. Paul
v. St. P. & Sioux City R. R., 23 Minn. 469 (1877) ; State v. St. Paul, 36 Minn.
529, 32 N. W. 781 (1887).
17. Cf. First Div. R. R. v. St. Paul, supra note 16; State v. District
Court, 31 Minn. 354, 17 N. W. 954 (1884) ; Washburn Mun. Orphan Asylum
v. State, 73 Minn. 343, 76 N. W. 204 (1898) ; Sloan v. Duluth, 194 Minn. 48,
259 N. WV.
393 (1935). But cf. Stinson v. Smith, supra note 16.
18. These cases hold that public moneys may not be expended on advertising to bring about a "yes" vote on a municipal bond issue: Mines v.
Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 257 Pac. 530 (1927) ; Elsenau v. Chicago, 334 Ill.
78, 165 N. F. 129 (1929). See 13 Minn. L. Rev. 739 (1929).
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light of the cost as shown by actual bids. If the council decides on
this arrangement, it should see that the advertisement for bids
(1) permits it to hold the best bid or bids for a number of days,
so that they will still be open to acceptance when the hearing has
been concluded and the improvement ordered made, and
(2) reserves the right to reject any and all bids for any portion
of the work (but probably the municipality has this right without
stating it).'9
However, the municipality may not wish to incur the expense of
getting final plans and specifications prepared until it has held the
hearing and ordered the improvement.
Many improvements, particularly paving, curb and gutter, and
sewer and water main extensions, are commonly initiated by a petition. The council must by resolution 20 determine whether it has
been signed by the owners of 35o in front footage of the property
abutting on the street where the improvement is petitioned to be
made. 2' While the council is not thereby obligated to go further, 22 at
least a resolution finding the petition to be sufficient has the effect of
lowering the council majority needed to order the improvement from
V to a bare majority of all its members, 2 and of ending the petitioners' right to withdraw their names.2 4 Sometimes such petitions
come from real estate developers, requesting water, sewer and paving for tracts to be developed as residential communities. In such
19. See § 429.041 (2) : '. . The council shall award the contract to the
lowest responsible bidder or it may reject all bids.... " Cf. Starkey v. Minneapolis, 19 Minn. (Gil. 166) 203 (1872).
20. There is nothing in the chapter to indicate that statutory and charter
provisions as to passage of resolutions do not apply; therefore I assume that
any resolutions required to be passed by the chapter must comply with such
provisions as to number of readings, publication, approval by mayor, passage
by particular majority (except the resolution ordering the improvement), etc.
I believe, however, that despite any charter requirements that action be taken
by ordinance, all council action under the chapter may be by resolution.
21. §§ 429.031 (1) and 429.035.
22. There is nothing in the chapter which expressly requires the council
to call an improvement hearing when a petition has been filed. By way of contrast, see Minn. Stat. §§ 429.04 and 429.21 (1949) (repealed). The requirement in § 429.031 (1) that the council secure a report on the feasibility of
the improvement and on how it may best be made implies that the council
need not call a hearing if the report is not favorable, despite the filing of a
sufficient petition. The question of whether an improvement shall or shall not
be ordered is normally within the legislative discretion of the council. Sherwood v. Duluth, 40 Minn. 22, 41 N. W. 234 (1889) ; Tate v. St. Paul, 56 Minn.
527, 58 N. W. 128 (1894) ; Janeway v. Duluth, 65 Minn. 292, 68 N. W. 24
(1896) ; State v. District Court, 89 Minn. 292, 94 N. W. 870 (1903) ; Diamond
v. Mankato, 89 Minn. 48, 93 N. W. 911 (1903) ; 13 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§ 37.25-37.27 (3d ed. 1950) ; accord, Wolfe v. Moorhead, 98 Minn.
113, 107 N. W. 728 (1906).
23. § 429.031 (1).
24. Cf. In re Dissolution of School Dist. No. 33, 60 N. W. 2d 60 (Min.
1953).
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situations the municipality runs the risk that the development will
fail, particularly if there are no houses on the tract, in which case the
assessments out of which the municipality will recoup the cost of the
improvement may not be paid. On the other hand, the council may
feel that the development, including the improvements, is needed by
the municipality. There seems to be no easy solution for such a dilemma. It is impractical to ask the developer to come back with his
petition after he has built his houses, because by then he will have
had to provide roads, wells and septic tanks, in order to sell them.
That is to say, he cannot afford to build the houses and keep them off
the market until the municipality has provided them with such improvements. The dilemma could perhaps be resolved if the municipality could induce the developer to execute a written guaranty of
payment of the special assessments to the municipality, thus adding his personal liability to the liability of the land to pay the
special assessments. Failing an arrangement of this kind, I should
think the council could reasonably take the position that if the
development is uncertain of success, the public necessity for the
25
improvement is correspondingly uncertain.
While liberal in its provisions, the chapter does not authorize
the making of any improvements outside the corporate limits, except sewer and water improvements, and parks, playgrounds and
recreational facilities. - It is not clear whether this exception in
favor of water and sewer improvements extends only so far as to
permit such items as wells, pumps, tanks, and disposal plants to be
built outside corporate limits, or whether it also permits water and
sewer laterals outside corporate limits to be included in an improvement. At any rate, nothing in the chapter is sufficient to overcome
the well-established rule that municipalities may not assess prop27
erty lying beyond their boundaries.
THE IMPROVEMENT HEARING

The council may not proceed with the proposed improvement
without calling and holding a hearing.2 Whoever is in charge of
25. MUunicipalities which have availed themselves of the city planning
activities sections (§§ 471.26-471.33) may under § 471.30, before a proposed
plat is approved, require that streets be graded and improved and water,
sewer and other utility facilities be installed or that a bond be furnished to
secure the construction and installation of such improvements within a period
specified by the council.

26. § 429.021 (1).

27. 14 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 38.62. But cf. §§ 456.29

and 456.30.

28. As required by § 429.031. This hearing is no doubt "jurisdictional,"
,. note 42 infra, but is not constitutionally required. State v. Burnes, 124

Minn. 471, 145 N. W. 377 (1914) ; In re Delinquent Taxes in Polk County,
147 Minn. 344, 180 N. XV. 240 (1920).
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drafting the notice of hearing should carefully examine § 429.021
to determine if the project consists of one or more than one improvement. The way this section is worded, so large a venture as a
complete sewage disposal plant, lift station and trunk sewer, with
sewer lines and service connections on various streets, is one improvement; on the other hand, a water main on one street and a
sewer line on another are two separate improvements. If there are
or may be two or more improvements, and they are to come up for
hearing at the same council meeting, it does not seem necessary to
publish separate notices of hearing; all that is necessary is to
describe each improvement separately in the notice, stating the
estimated cost for each one, and to provide that there will be a
separate hearing on each improvement. After conclusion of the
hearing or hearings, when ordering the improvements to be made, 29
the council may order the improvements to be consolidated under
§ 435.56, particularly if it contemplates that they will all be contracted for, financed and assessed at about the same times. Of course,
they can under the statute just cited be consolidated later on, or
reconsolidated with other current improvements. In ordering improvements or consolidated improvements, most municipalities follow the practice of giving them a short descriptive name and number, such as "Paving Improvement No. 1," or "Water and Sewer
Improvement No. 1," for ease of reference in subsequent proceedings.
It is very important that the notice of hearing correctly describe
the area proposed to be assessed. In the first place, as the law now
stands, the council may not later assess property not included in
this description."0 Thus, even before the hearing is held, this area
must be definitely ascertained. Secondly, the description should be
sufficiently definite to enable any property-owner to tell whether
his property is included in the area to be assessed. A description of
this area as "the area which will be benefited by said improvement" is, I think, too uninformative.
The determination of the area to be assessed is most difficult in
the case of storm sewer improvements. It is elementary that property may not be assessed which is not specially benefited ;31 con29. This may be done any time within 6 months after the hearing. §
429.031 (1). Quaere, in the case of a hearing adjourned from time to time,
whether the six months run from the first or the last date of hearing.
30. § 429.051. However, if the original assessment is invalid, the reassessment may include property not described in the notice of hearing. Cf.
State v. District Court, 95 Minn. 503, 104 N. W. 533 (1905).
31. Minn. Const. Art. IX, § 1. The Minnesota cases are cited in 13
Dunnel, Minnesota Digest § 6862 (3d ed. 1954).

1954]

ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE

versely, property which is specially benefited should be assessed. 2
What, however, of a system of storm sewers providing drainage of
surface waters in a particular area: should the higher lots therein,
which have natural drainage, be assessed? Probably all property
in the area is benefited by the storm sewer system, since it clears
water from the public streets therein, and by removing standing
surface water promotes general health and safety conditions. While
all property in the area may therefore be assessed, the council might
in some situations establish a higher rate of assessment on the lower
lots which are actually drained.33
At the hearing all persons interested should have a chance to be
heard, not just those who are liable to be assessed. I think this is
implied because the statute34 requires a "public hearing," without
specifying who is to be heard. Since the improvement contract (and
probably also the financing) will be a general liability of the municipality even if the whole cost will be specially assessed,35 all residents and creditors of the municipality have a practical interest in
presenting their views. It is then for the council to order or not to
order the improvement, as it may see fit.3 While the council ought
to consider any public sentiment against the improvement, there is
nothing in the statute forcing the council to bow to it, even if it is
overwhelming. Where an expensive improvement generally affecting the whole municipality is proposed, some councils favor holding an "advisory" or "popular sentiment" election. Such an election, on the question of making the improvement itself, is not
authorized and presumably has no legal effect whatsoever. 37 However, there is authority for calling an election on the issuance of
bonds to finance the improvement, or on the pledge of municipal
liquor store revenues to the payment of bonds financing certain improvements, as discussed later in this Article, and such an election
may be a convenient substitute for an advisory election.
However, where the improvement is the first entry by the
municipality into a new utility business, statutory provisions ex32. See State v. District Court, 33 Minn. 295, 23 N. W. 222 (1885);
State v. District Court, 80 Minn. 293, 83 N. W. 183 (1900); Mayer v.
Shakopee, 114 Minn. 80, 130 N. W. 77 (1911). These cases indicate that in
the absence of fraud or demonstrable mistake, the court will not upset the
municipality's determination that there was no benefit to certain properties.
33. Cf. Sherwood v. Duluth, 40 Minn. 22, 41 N. W. 234 (1889).
34. § 429.031 (1).
35. Accord, State v. Ely, 129 Minn. 40, 151 N. W. 545 (1915).
36. See note 22 supra. It also stands to reason that if the council has
ordered an improvement, it may subsequently rescind such action.

37. Cf. Muebring v. School Dist. No. 31, 224 Minn. 432, 28 N. W. 2d

655 (1947). While the council may nevertheless wish to hold an election of a

purely advisory nature, it is doubtful whether municipal funds may be expended on an election which has no legal effect.
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traneous to the chapter do require an election on the establishment
of the utility before such improvement may be made. 8 The most
important provisions are § 412.321 (villages; waterworks or gas,
light, power or heat plants), § 452.02 (certain cities; most utilities), and § 455.24 (4th class cities; electric light systems). Special
and home-rule charters may contain similar provisions. For certain
improvements, a concurring resolution of the park board or the
utilities commission is required. 8
Although, as pointed out above, the municipality may have
plans and specifications prepared and receive construction bids before the improvement hearing, it is essential, for the subsequent
levy of assessments for all or part of the cost of the improvement,
that the hearing be held and the improvement ordered before the
construction' contract is awarded, or the work ordered done by day
labor.40 In turn, the right to issue improvement bonds or warrants
is by implication predicated on the council's having properly awarded a contract or ordered the work done by day labor.41 It is clear
that the hearing is a mandatory step in the assessment procedure, 42 and therefore the owners of property to be assessed may get further
proceedings enjoined if the council omits this step. 43 Lack of an
initial hearing, or irregularities in holding it, in the absence of
44
waiver, are grounds for setting aside an assessment.
TSaE IMPROVEMENT CONTRACT

The provisions of § 429.041 regarding the advertisement for
construction bids, the awarding of improvement contracts, the do38. It isperhaps arguable that since the chapter is a complete enactment
on improvements for which assessments will be levied, and since itnowhere
requires voter approval of improvements, no election is therefore required as
to any improvements made under the chapter. However, I believe that under
ordinary principles of statutory construction, particularly as stated in §
645.39, other statutes requiring elections remain applicable.
39. § 429.031 (2).
40. § 429.031 (1) ; Nelson v. Willmar, 201 Minn. 305, 276 N. W. 234
(1937) semble (contract held void). But a contract awarded prematurely
under this chapter might still be enforceable against the municipality and its
taxpayers, ifitwere correctly advertised and violated no charter or statutory
budget limitations.
41. § 429.091 (1).
42. The giving of notice and holding of a hearing, where required by
statutes such as the chapter, are generally held to be "jurisdictional" and
mandatory. In re Meyer, 158 Minn. 433, 197 N. W. 970, 199 N. W. 746 (1924)
(opinion by Holt, J.) ; 13 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§ 37.40, 37.51.
43. Cf. Soukup v. New Prague, 161 Minn. 299, 201 N. W. 604 (1924) ;
see Ia re Meyer, supra note 42 at 441, 199 N. W. at 747 (1924). As to the
right of the general taxpayers to get an injunction, compare Patterson v.
Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 96 Minn. 9,104 N. W. 566 (1905), with Merritt
v. Duluth, 103 Minn. 236, 114 N. W. 758 (1908).
44. Hawkins v. Horton, 91 Minn. 285, 97 N. W. 1053 (1904); In re
Meyer, 158 Minn. 433, 197 N. XV. 970, 199 N. W. 746 (1924) (only 10 days'
published notice given, 14 being required).
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ing of work by day labor, and the furnishing of materials and equipment by the municipality are lengthy but generally well worded.
They tend to be more liberal and flexible than other Minnesota
statutory and charter provisions on the same subject. For improvements made under the chapter, they of course supersede other and
more stringent limitations otherwise applicable. 45 Among the liberal
rules in this section are those permitting the improvement to be
done by day labor if the engineer estimates the cost will be less
than $5,000,6 and permitting the council to advertise separately
for various portions of the job, or to combine several improvements
into one advertisement for bids. Despite their liberality, the public
bidding rules are mandatory; if they are not observed, the contract
will be invalid.4 7 As previously stated, if the contract is not properly awarded, the council may not issue obligations under § 412.091
to finance the improvement.
Before it starts to contract for the making of an expensive improvement, the council ought to survey the availability of financing.
If it has reason to believe that it may not be able to get financing at
45. §§ 429.021 (3) and 429.111; as to villages, see § 412.311. Sections
471.01-471.04 probably do not apply to proceedings under the chapter, since the

latter requires publication of the estimated cost in the notice of hearing, and

also requires public bidding. However, §§ 471.87-471.89 are undoubtedly applicable to improvement contracts. General laws may constitutionally supersede home rule charter provisions. E.g., State v. Peterson, 180 Minn. 366, 230
N. W. 830 (1930).
46. May the council, if the estimated cost of the improvement is less than
$5,000, award a construction contract therefor without public bidding? This
epends on the proper interpretation of § 429.041 (2) where it says that in
such cases "the council may ... without advertising for bids, directly purchase
the materials for the work and do it by the employment of day labor or in

any other manner the council considers proper." Possibly the municipality
should comply with applicable statutory and charter public bidding provisions
in such cases if it does not propose itself to purchase the materials and hire
the work done by day labor but intends to hire a contractor. Quaere, also,

whether in purchasing materials to be used on any improvement, whenever
permitted by § 429.041, public bidding provisions must be observed, such as
§ 471.34-471.37 (all municipalities), § 412.311 (villages), and § 365.37

(towns). The public bidding rules of § 429.041 are undoubtedly applicable to
contracts made under § 429.041 (4), as well as §§ 471.34-471.37.
47. E.g., Schiffman v. St Paul, 88 Minn. 43, 92 N. W. 503 (1902);
Arpin v. Thief River Falls, 122 Minn. 34, 141 N. W. 833 (1913) (franchise) ;
Fargo Foundry Co. v. Callaway, 148 Minn. 273, 181 N. W. 584 (1921) ; Casey
v. Central Elec. & Tel. Co., 202 Minn. 510, 279 N. W. 263 (1938) (franchise) ;

and Coller v. St. Paul, 223 Minn. 376, 26 N. W. 2d 835 (1947). Despite such
invalidity of the contract, the Minnesota supreme court has generally per-

mitted a quasi-contractual recovery, provided the contract is not ultra vires

in the primary sense and not tainted with fraud. Kotschevar v. North Fork,

229 Minn. 234, 39 N. W. 2d 107 (1949) (reviewing many of the cases). A good
review of the Minnesota law on recovery on ultra vires municipal contracts
will be found in Note, 34 Mfinn. L. Rev. 46 (1949). For the distinction betxeen contracts ultra vires in the primary and in the secondary sense, see Bell
v. Kirkland, 102 Minn. 213, 113 N. W. 271 (1907) ; Oliver Iron Mining Co.
v. Independent School Dist. No. 35, 155 Minn. 400, 193 N. W. 949 (1923) ;
Marcs v. Janutka, 196 Minn. 87, 264 N. W. 222 (1936) ; Kotschevar v. North
Fork, supra; Note, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 46 (1949).
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all, or only at an interest rate it would be unwilling to accept, it is
faced by this dilemma: if it awards the improvement contract before financing is arranged, it may render the municipality liable to
the contractor for a breach of contract, or may have to sell bonds
on terms it considers unwise; on the other hand, bonds may not be
issued until the contract has been awarded.4 8 The solution is either
to negotiate a commitment with a bond purchaser, in advance of the
letting of the contract, to purchase an approximate number of
bonds, 49 or to receive construction bids on the basis that the best
bid or bids may be held for 30 days, and in the interval arrange a
private or public sale of the bonds.
I feel there is no point in rehearsing in this Article such matters as what the advertisement for bids must contain, and how the
advertisement must be published, the chapter being its own clear
expositor on these requirements. There are a number of matters,
however, not covered by the chapter, which will bear comment.
For example, there is the question whether, in the plans and
specifications and the contract for the improvement, there may be
included a provision for repairs or for a guarantee of maintenance
of the improvement during a certain period after construction. It
is well settled that the municipality may not include in the contract
for an improvement an item for future repairs, and charge such
item to the property-owners; however, if the item is found to be
merely a guarantee of good workmanship and extends for a reasonable time only, it may be included in the cost to be assessed. 0 By
analogy, if the municipality is having the work done by day labor, it
should be permitted to include in the cost to be assessed the amount
which it reasonably expects to spend in correcting defects which
experience indicates will become apparent soon after the job is
done.
The chapter requires that plans and specifications be drawn up
for any improvement ;51 by implication, the improvement contract
must conform to the plans and specifications. 52 This is of course
48. § 429.091 (1).
49. It is technically possible to hold a public sale of the bonds before or
concurrently with the letting of the contract, since the contract will be awarded
before the bonds are actually issued, but the practical objection is that before
the bids are opened there will not be a definite amount of bonds to be bid for.
Furthermore, the municipality runs the risk, if it sells the bonds first, that the
project cannot be carried out because the construction bids are too high.
50. State v. District Court, 80 Minn. 293, 83 N. W. 183 (1900); 13
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§ 37.92, 37.113; 14 id. § 38.17. If the repair item can be and is segregated, and not more than the remaining cost is
assessed, it seems that those assessed can have no valid objection.
51. § 429.041 (1).
52. Le Tourneau v. Hugo, 90 Minn. 420, 97 N. W. 115 (1903) ; Coller v.
St. Paul, 223 Minn. 376, 26 N. W. 2d 835 (1947).
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necessary if there is to be true competitive bidding. But suppose
among the bids received, the lowest one specifies a different material, or a different type of construction, from that proposed in the
plans and specifications; may the council accept such a bid? The
answer to this question seems to depend on whether the variance is
a material one, and this, according to the cases, depends primarily
on whether it gives the low bidder a substantial advantage over
other bidders5 3 Even if the municipal officials in good faith believe
it is to the advantage of the municipality to accept the bid which
materially varies from the plans and specifications, they may not
do so." However, bids need not be rejected which propose alternative materials'or methods of installation, etc., as long as they are
open for acceptance within the terms of the plans and specifications55 Apparently whether a particular variance is material is not
a merely administrative question as to which the council has any
wide latitude for decision, because the cases quite thoroughly review the facts whenever the question is presented. 6
A similar problem, also stemming from the letter and the spirit
of public bidding requirements, arises after the contract has been
awarded and changes in the amount or nature of the work appear
necessary or desirable. Most plans and specifications for municipal
improvements provide that the council may order such changes, and
require that bids be submitted on the basis of unit prices for work
and materials, additions to or deductions from the total contract
price to be made at unit prices in the event that changes are made
in the extent of the improvement. Where the plans and specifications are so drawn, the council may order additional quantities of
work and materials without advertising for competitive bids. 57
Even if there are no specific provisions in the plans or contract for
changes in the scope of the improvement, municipal officers must
53. Diamond v. Mankato, 89 Minn. 48, 93 N. W. 911 (1903); Rice v.
St. Paul, 208 Minn. 509, 295 N. W. 529 (1940) ; Coller v. St. Paul, supra
note 52. But in Sutton v. St. Paul, 234 Minn. 263, 48 N. W. 2d 436 (1951),
the court stated that substantial advantage to the noncomplying bidder is not
the only test: the bid must respond to specifications in all material respects.
This statement is no doubt correct. For instance, specifications call for 4"
curbs, but A's bid is for 6" curbs, and it is the low bid. The council considers
4" curbs safer and more convenient, so it should not have to accept A's bid.
52. 54. Diamond v. Mankato, supra note 53; Coller v. St. Paul, supra note
55. Cf. Hendricks v. Minneapolis, 207 Minn. 151, 290 N. W. 428 (1940);
Coller v. St. Paul, supra note 54.
56. Cf. cases cited in notes 52-55 supra; Interstate Power Co. v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 194 Minn. 110, 259 N. W. 691 (1935) ; Bemidji v. Ervin,
204 Minn. 90, 282 N. W. 683 (1938).
57. Carson v. Dawson, 129 Minn. 453, 152 N. V. 842 (1915). The reasoning in the opinion also appears to sanction ordering of decreases without
readvertising.
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be allowed some reasonable discretion to make them, if they are
58
necessary or advisable.
Section 429.041 (2) says the contract shall be awarded to the lowest "responsible" bidder. It seems to be definitely established that the
council has a wide discretion in deciding who is a responsible bidder, and the courts will not be likely to interfere with their decision. 55 Section 429.041(1) requires the advertisement for bids to
state that "no bids will be considered unless ... accompanied by a
cash deposit, cashier's check, bid bond, or certified check" for a
stated percentage of the amount of the bid. However, the council can
still enter into a binding contract with a bidder who fails to submit
such security. 0 The fact that only one bid was submitted does not,
under § 471.34, bar the council from accepting it, provided the bid
includes the necessary work, as well as the furnishing of materials
and equipment.6 '
Even if the council has in all respects so far complied with the
improvement procedure, it may be embarrassed to find that the lowest bid is substantially in excess of the engineer's estimate of the
cost. The obvious argument against accepting the bid is that the
improvement which was ordered and on which the hearing was
held was one costing approximately that dollar amount which was
stated in the notice of hearing as being its estimated cost, and therefore there has been no hearing on this improvement, nor any resolution ordering it. On the other hand, the council can claim that a
hearing was held on this improvement, despite the difference between the estimated and the actual cost, because the notice did
describe this particular improvement, and did give as correct an
estimate of the cost as was then possible; and further, conceding
the estimated cost to have been a material element in deliberating
on the improvement, that it was not meant to be a top limitation,
58. Accord, O'Dea v. Winona, 41 Minn. 424, 43 N. W. 97 (1889) ; see
Diamond v. Makato, 89 Minn. 48, 55, 93 N. W. 911, 914 (1903) (dissenting
opinion). It may seem to be contrary to the public policy in favor of competitive bidding to permit subsequent changes in improvement contracts, but it
is better policy that municipal officials should not be irrevocably committed to

carry out strictly a contract which it later appears should, in the best interests of the municipality, be changed. Obviously the municipality, already

bound on the contract awarded, cannot readvertise for bids. However, sub-

stantial variances introduced into the contract by the municipality at the time
it is awarded cannot be justified because at that time the municipality is free

to reject all bids and readvertise according to revised plans and specifications.
Blet cf. O'Dea v. Winona, supra.
59. State v. Snively, 175 Minn. 379, 221 N. W. 535 (1928); Otter Tail
Power Co. v. Elbow Lake, 234 Minn. 419, 49 N. W. 2d 197 (1951); Otter Tail
Power Co. v. Wheaton, 235 Minn. 123, 49 N. W. 2d 804 (1951).
60. Cf. Tunny v. Hastings, 121 Minn. 212, 141 N. W. 168 (1913).
61. Otter Tail Power Co. v. Elbow Lake, 234 Minn. 419, 49 N. W. 2d
197 (1951).
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fixed or approximate, on the amount which could be spent, but "was
precisely what its name imported, to-wit, an approximate judgment or opinion. 0' 2 As to the resolution ordering the improvement,
the council can argue either that (1) it still stands, because the estimated cost was not an essential or controlling element in the council's decision to make the improvement, or that (2) while the
former resolution is voided, the resolution awarding the contract
(if adopted within six months after the date of hearing) comprehends within it the necessary order that the improvement be made.
To avoid any question in this situation, the council could, if the
delay will not be harmful and it has reserved the right to hold bids
for a sufficient period, hold a rehearing on the same notice as the
original hearing, but stating the new cost figure, before awarding
3
the contract.
A bond "conditioned as required by law" must be furnished
with the contract. 4 It must comply with § 574.26 et seq.6 5 The
bond ought to include all the provisions required by statute, for although when a bond is obviously given for the purpose of complying with statute, the Minnesota court has said that it will liberally
construe the language of the bond in the light of the statute,6 it
has indicated that it will not supply non-existent provisions. 6 7 On
62. Nash v. St Paul, 23 Minn. 132, 135 (1876).
63. This problem will not arise if, as suggested earlier, the hearing is
held after opening of bids.
64. § 429.041 (2). If no bond is furnished, the contract is void. See
§ 574.26; Lundin v. Butternut Valley, 172 Minn. 259, 214 N. W. 888 (1927).
65. Minn. Laws 1929, c. 369, added the following to the text of § 574.26:
"The provisions hereof shall govern every municipal corporation or other
public board or body in this state, any provision in any general or special act
or charter to the contrary notwithstanding. It shall not be necessary to obtain
leave of court to bring any action against any principal or surety in any such
bond." Apparently this addition to the section was the legislature's answer to
Rand Kardex Service Corp. v. Forrestal, 174 Minn. 579, 219 N. W. 943
(1928), holding that Duluth home rule charter and ordinance provisions regarding contractors' bonds prevailed over statutory provisions. However, this
language was omitted from Minn. Laws 1931, c. 229, further amending the
section, and has never since reappeared. An unpublished opinion of the Attorney General (83-F, Sept. 9, 1932) stated that this language was, nevertheless, still in effect, but this is possibly not the case since the enactment of the
Minnesota Revised Statutes of 1945. Cf. State ex rel. Bergin v. Washburn,
224 Minn. 269, 28 N. W. 2d 652 (1947). But cf. State v. Pierz, 62 N. W. 2d
493 (Minn. 1954). The sensible course for a municipality to take is to require
the bond to comply with the statutory as well as local requirements, if any.
66. Waterous Engine Works v. Clinton, 110 Minn. 267, 125 N. W. 269
(1910); Fairmont Cement Stone MIfg. Co. v. Davison, 122 Minn. 504, 142
N. Xr. 899 (1913) ; Fay v. Bankers Surety Co., 125 Minn. 211, 146 N. W.
162 (1914) ; Ceco Steel Products Corp. v. Tapager, 208 Minn. 367, 294 N. XV.
210 (1940).
67. Scott-Graff Lum. Co. v. Independent School Dist. No. 1, 112 Minn.
474, 128 N. W. 672 (1910) ; Fairmont Cement Stone Mfg. Co. v. Davison,
supra note 66; Fay v. Bankers Surety Co., supra note 66; Ceco Steel Products
Corp. v. Tapager, supra note 66.
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the other hand, in Guaranteed Gravel& Sand Co. v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co.,8 the court wrote into the bond a provision it did not
contain.
In § 429.041(5), the chapter expressly contemplates the possibility that a municipality may undertake an improvement jointly
with the state, the county, or another municipality, and that the
other party will advertise for bids and award the improvement contract. Express authority to make co-operative agreements for joint
improvements is not found in § 429.041 (5), but is given in various
other statutes,6 9 each of which has special requirements to be observed, over and above the requirements of the chapter. If city B
is to advertise for bids and award the contract, city A should in the
co-operative agreement protect itself by reserving the right to pass
on the plans, specifications, contract proposal and form of advertisement for bids, to make sure that they (1) comply in all respects
with the intentions of the parties and the public bidding rules of
city B,7 0 and (2) do not permit bids for other improvements of city
B to be tied to bids for the joint project.71 City A should also
stipulate in the agreement that it will not be bound on the improvement contract until it has passed a concurring resolution approving
it. This will protect city A from city B's having let the job for too
high a price, or having awarded a contract in violation of the applicable public bidding law. City B may, of course, rightfully insist
on the reciprocal provision that its award of the contract is not
final until city A has adopted its concurring resolution. In many
cases it may be advisable, also, to limit each city's liability, vis a vis
the contractor, to that amount or percentage of the cost charged to
the city in the co-operative agreement.
68. 174 Minn. 366, 219 N. W. 546 (1928).
69. Chiefly § 471.59, permitting any state governmental units except the
state itself to enter into co-operative projects under an agreement. Section
160.41 authorizes municipalities and the commissioner of highways to enter
into agreements for construction of trunk highways within corporate limits.
Section 160.431 authorizes such agreements, as to state aid roads, between
counties and municipalities. Section 435.36 authorizes agreements between
counties and municipalities as to state aid or county aid roads. Section 161.03
(26) authorizes municipalities to appoint the commissioner of highways as
agent for construction of federally aided roads and bridges or for construction of roads and bridges connecting with such federally aided improvement.
There are a number of sections of Minn. Stat., c. 162, which provide for
appropriations to or reimbursements of municipalities by counties for the
improvement of roads, streets or bridges with-n municipal boundaries, but
these sections do not contemplate that the improvement contract will be
awarded by the county.

70. § 429.041 (5).

71. If bids for sole improvements of city B are permitted to be tied to
bids for the joint improvement, there is a possible argument that city A is
participating, under § 471.59, in construction of city B improvements, which

of course it has no power to do.
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IMPROVEMENT BoNDs
Having awarded a contract for making the improvement, or
ordered it done by day labor, the council may then calculate the
total expense of the improvement, 72 determine by resolution the
amount to be paid out of general ad valorem tax levies and the
amount to be assessed, if any, and issue obligations to pay for the
improvement.7 3 It may also proceed with preparation of the assessment roll and levy of the assessments, but the assessment procedure
normally comes after the issuance of the obligations.
In determining the portions of the cost to be assessed and to be
raised by general taxation, the chief consideration is: what is the
amount of special benefits to property, as distinguished from general
benefits to the whole community?74 Actually, every improvement
confers both special and general benefits 25 At first blush, a municipal sewage or waterworks plant seems to confer purely general
benefits, but surely there must be some properties in the municipality which do not, and never will, benefit from its operation, and
even more surely, all of the properties do not benefit equally. Contrariwise, the paving of a dead-end street seems to involve no
general benefit whatever, but a general benefit may be derived, for
instance, from greater ease of street maintenance.76 Fortunately,
72. § 429.061 (1). The expense figure should cover the contract price
and all incidental items. § 429.091 (1); St Paul v. Mullen, 27 Minn. 78, 6
N. W. 424 (1880) ; Burns v. Duluth, 96 Minn. 104, 104 N. W. 714 (1905). The
obvious incidental items are the cost of acquiring necessary land or easements, engineering cost, legal fees, fiscal agent's fees, publication costs, and
expense of bond printing; there may also be included the following:
(a) Engineering and other services of salaried municipal officers and rental
value of municipal equipment used. In re Improvement of Lake of the
Isles Park, 152 Minn. 29, 188 N. W. 54 (1922).
(b) Capitalization of interest to be paid on the bonds before taxes and
special assessments can be collected. Accord, Otter Tail Power Co. v.
Wheaton, 235 Minn. 123, 49 N. W. 2d 804 (1951).
(c) When work is to be done by day labor, an allowance for repairing the
original construction, as previously discussed.
(d) The total fees to be paid to the county auditor by municipalities in
Hennepin County under Minn. Laws 1953, c. 74.
73. p429.091 (1).
74. § 429.051 requires the assessments to be based upon the benefits received. Cf. Minn. Const. Art. IX, § 1: "... the legislature may authorize
municipal corporations to levy and collect assessments for local hiprovements
upon property benefited thereby without regard to a cash valuation ......
[Emphasis added]. "Local improvements" in this section of the constitution
means "improvements made in a particular locality, by which the real property
adjoining or near such locality is specially benefited." Rogers v. St. Paul, 22
Minn. 494, 507 (1876). To the same effect: In re Improvement of Lake of the
Isles Park 152 Minn. 29, 188 N. W. 54 (1922).
75. Accord, Rogers v. St. Paul, supra note 74; and see State v. District
Court, 33 Minn. 295, 23 N. IV. 222 (1885) (good discussion).
76. I do not mean to imply that the general benefits must be so narrowly appraised, in order to justify payment of part of the cost of the improvement by general taxation, as the special benefits must be, in order to
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the courts give a wide discretion to municipal governing bodies in
the determination of benefits, holding that their determination is
final, unless it can be shown that they (1) acted fraudulently, or
(2) made a palpable mistake of fact, or (3) applied a mistaken rule
of assessment.77 The measure of the special benefits is the enhancement of the market value of the property caused by the improvement.78 This being the rule, it is improper to proportion the assessments according to the present value of the property.79 The market
value of property may be enhanced by an improvement even though
the property does not abut on the improvement or cannot immediately be served by it.8° The market value of property may also be
enhanced although the improvement does not add to its value for
the use to which it is presently devoted, as long as it adds to its
value for other uses.8 '
Having determined the amount of the benefits, the council must
make sure that the proportion of the cost to be assessed does not
exceed the benefits, as it has been repeatedly held that assessments
in excess of benefits are invalid.8 2- The council ought also to ask
itself the following practical questions about the assessments:
justify the levy of special assessments. All of the improvements authorized by
the chapter are public improvements and legitimate objects for the expenditure of money raised by general taxation.
77. State v. District Court, 33 Minn. 295, 23 N. W. 222 (1885) ; State v.
District Court, 68 Minn. 242, 71 N. W. 27 (1897) ; State v. District Court,
80 Minn. 293, 83 N. W. 183 (1900) ; State v. District Court, 95 Minn. 70, 103
N. W. 744 (1905) ; Mayer v. Shakopee, 114 Minn. 80, 130 N. W. 77 (1911) ;
In re Assessment for Mississippi River Blvd., 169 Minn. 231, 211 N. W. 9
(1926).
78. In re Improvement of Superior Street, 172 Minn. 554, 216 N. W.
318 (1927), cert. denied, 276 U. S. 628 (1928) ; cf. Armour v. Litchfield, 152
Minn. 382, 188 N. W. 1006 (1922).
79. In re Improvement of Third Street, 185 Minn. 170, 240 N. W. 355
(1932). Section 429.061 (1) requires the assessments to be calculated without
regard to cash valuation.
80. State v. District Court, 33 Minn. 295, 23 N. W. 222 (1885) ; Strickland v. Stillwater, 63 Minn. 43, 65 N. W. 131 (1895) ; St. Paul v. Sanborn,
176 Minn. 62, 222 N. W. 522 (1928). Section 429.051 provides that "the cost
... may be assessed upon property ... whether the property abuts on the improvement or not .... The classic fact situation is that portrayed in the Sanborn case, where a trunk sewer must be constructed big enough to serve eventually an entire drainage district, but the district is at present only partially
built up, so that the mains and laterals are left to be added later. It is unjust
that only those properties in the district immediately tied into the sewer sys-

tem should bear the cost of the trunk sewer. But no benefit can accrue to
property so situated that it cannot be connected to a lateral sewer without
trespassing on private property. State v. District Court, 90 Minn. 540, 97
N. W. 425 (1903).
81. In re Improvement of Superior Street, 172 Minn. 554, 216 N. W. 318
(1927), cert. denied, 276 U. S. 628 (1928) ; In re Assessment for Widening
East Fourth Street, 173 Minn. 67, 216 N. W. 607 (1927); Board of Park
Comm'rs v. Bremner, 190 Minn. 534, 252 N. W. 451 (1934); Qvale v. Willmar, 223 Minn. 51, 25 N. W. 2d 699 (1946); Note, 12 Minn. L. Rev. 524
(1928) (railroad property).
82. E.g., Armour v. Litchfield, 152 Minn. 382, 188 N. W. 1006 (1922);
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(1) Is the proposed apportionment of the cost between special
assessments and general taxes in line with what is, or ought to be,
the policy of the municipality? For instance, if all the cost of paving
A Street was assessed to the abutting owners, then is it fair to
assess only 50% of the cost of paving B Street to the abutting
owners?
(2) What other revenues is it the policy of the municipality to
use to aid in paying for improvements of the type in question? Possible sources of revenues are discussed further on.
(3) Are the proposed assessments too high in relation to the
market value of the land plus the improvement? For example, if an
unimproved tract is worth $25 and the improvement increases its
market value to $225, an assessment of $200 will be valid; however,
the municipality will in effect have a mortgage for about 90% of
the value of the land, 3 and the owner will lose only $25 by letting
it go for taxes. Obviously, the risk of failure to collect the assessments in such a situation is serious, and will adversely affect the
terms on which the municipality can finance the improvement. The
council should consider whether the public necessity for the improvement outweighs the risk.
Finally, and especially in gauging the capacity of the property
to pay the assessments, the council should consider the number of
4
annual installments into which the assessments are to be divided.
Like the determination of the proper proportion of the cost to be
assessed, this is also a proper subject for the exercise of an over-all
policy. As a practical matter, the assessments should in general not
run longer than a conservative estimate of the life of the improvement. The shorter the period, the shorter the bond maturities may
be, and also the lower the interest rate on the bonds.
Under § 429.091 (3), the council is not required, if it is specially assessing at least 20% of the cost 85 of the improvement, to call
an election on the issuance of obligations to finance all or part of
In re Assessment for Mississippi River Blvd., 169 Minn. 231, 211 N. W. 9
(1926). It seems, however, that the determination of the assessments by the
council will not be disturbed by the courts unless it is greatly or materially
in excess of the benefits. See the two cases just cited; also, it re Assessment
for Paving Concord Street 148 Minn. 329, 181 N. W. 859 (1921) ; It re Improvement of Superior Street, 172 Minn. 554, 216 N. W. 318 (1927), cert.
deeied, 276 U. S. 628 (1928).
83. On the assumption that the municipality finances the improvement
from available moneys on hand, or by issuing general obligation improvement
bonds; if the improvement is financed by issuing improvement warrants, the
risk that the assessments will not be paid falls on the warrant holders.
84. Not to exceed 20. § 429.061 (2).
85. Note that the formula is 20% of the "cost", not of the principal
amount of the obligations.
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such cost. 86 Some home-rule charters require that all bonds must be
submitted to a vote, with only a few unimportant exceptions for refunding bonds, judgment bonds, etc. Such charter provisions are,
I believe, not applicable to obligations issued under the chapter."
Some councils seem to desire voter approval of bond issues even
though such approval is not legally required. It seems that there is
authority for holding an election on improvement obligations, even
when more than 20% of the cost of the improvement is to be assessed. In the first place, all that the chapter says is that an election
is not "required" in such cases, and the wording of § 475.58 of the
bond code is also neutral. Secondly, § 429.091 (3) provides that "all
obligations shall be issued in accordance with the provisions of
Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 475, ' 'ss and § 475.57 provides that
an initial resolution for the issuance of bonds shall be adopted,
which "may provide for the submission of the question [of the issuance of bonds] to vote of the electors." However, one should assume
that a bond election will have the effect of holding the council to
issuing no more bonds than the amount stated in the ballot, and
therefore such a restriction may be hampering if the election is held
before the final estimated cost figure has become available.
The improvement obligations, whether they are bonds or warrants, are not subject to legal debt limits."9 However, they must not
be issued in excess of the cost of the improvement or improvements
to be financed. 90 Due to the necessity for meeting periodic payments on the improvement contract,91 the bonds or warrants are
usually issued before the work has been completed and the final
cost figure established. The amount of the obligations must therefore necessarily be based on an estimate of the cost, which may
turn out to have been set too high. If there are any proceeds of the
obligations left over after payment of all expenses of the improvement or improvements, they should be transferred to the fund
established under § 429.091 (4) for payment of the obligations."
Before selling the improvement obligations, the council must
decide whether to make them general obligations ("improvement
86. See also § 475.58 (1), subparagraphs (3) and (6). § 429.091 (1)
places the basic power to issue obligations in the council.
87. See §§ 429.021 (3) and 429.111, and cf. Pike v. Marshall, 146 Minn.
413, 178 N. W. 1006 (1920).
88. Incidentally, this subjects improvement obligations to the numerous
miscellaneous provisions of Chapter 475, such as: they must mature serially
(§ 475.54), may not promise to pay interest at a rate higher than 6% per
annum (§ 475.55), etc.
89. §§ 429.091 (3), 475.51 (4) and 475.53.

90. See § 429.091 (1).
91.

See § 429041 (6).

92. See § 475.65.
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bonds") or special obligations ("improvement warrants"). The
difference is that bonds are secured by a promise to pay out of
other municipal funds and out of unlimited additional tax levies,
should it turn out that the original taxes and assessments levied to
pay the cost of the improvement are insufficient ;9 but warrants
are payable only out of the originally-levied taxes and assessments. 94
Naturally enough, municipalities can dispose of improvement warrants only at higher interest rates, if at all, and therefore they have
rarely been issued in recent times. They will not be dealt with
further.
The bond maturities generally correspond to the schedule of installments of assessments and taxes,U but with a suitable lag to
allow time for collection of such installments. Since § 429.061(2)
limits the number of installments of assessments to 20, this usually
means that the bonds mature finally in 22 years or less, depending
on the number of installments of assessments. The reservation of a
privilege to call all or a part of the bonds for redemption before
maturity presents a problem. Such a privilege is desirable, if any
of the bonds run out longer than about 10 years, in order to take full
advantage of prepayments of special assessments,9" but all of the
usual schemes have their disadvantages, as follows:
(1) All bonds callable on any interest payment date: the bonds
cannot ordinarily be sold to advantage on the general market, but perhaps a local investor, usually a bank, may be
willing to buy the entire issue on this basis.
(2) Some bonds non-callable, but the rest callable on any interest payment date: in a sale of the bonds on the general
market, the non-callable bonds may "carry" the others if
93. Bergman v. Golden Valley, 201 Minn. 28, 275 N. W. 297 (1937),

construing provisions similar to § 429.091 (2).

94. § 429.091 (2). The only liability of the city on the warrants, beyond
the statutory one of paying them out of the moneys in the improvement fund

on which they are issued, is for failure to levy sufficient valid assessments, or

for negligence in collecting them and applying them to the proper improvemnt fund. Cf. Leslie v. White Bear Lake, 186 Minn. 543, 243 N, W. 486

(1932) ; Judd v. St. Cloud, 198 Minn.590, 272 N. W. 577 (1936).
95. See § 429.091 (3).

96. See § 429.061 (3). It is usually very difficult to estimate the amount

which property-owners will prepay, under § 429.061 (3), before the assessment
roll is certified to the county auditor. While many property-owners say they
will prepay, often this intention is not carried out. The rate of assessment

prepayments later on will to a large extent depend on the rate of turnover in

property, because in most real estate transactions the buyer insists on getting
title free and clear of the lien of assessments.
The call privilege may also be of great valie, in the case of a bond issue with
long maturities, in permitting the later-maturing bonds which remain unpaid
when the privilege becomes exercisable to be redeemed and refunded at a

lower rate of interest.
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the ratio of callable bonds to non-callable bonds is small.
Alternatively, the non-callable bonds may be sold on the
general market, and the callable ones sold locally.
(3) All bonds maturing 10 or more years after date of issue
callable at or after such time: this arrangement is palatable
to bond buyers, but assessment prepayments cannot, during the period of 10 or more years in which no bonds may
be called, be used to pay off bonds and stop the running of
interest.
(4) All bonds callable after a shorter period than 10 years from
date of issue, at a premium: the redemption premium tends
to take the curse off the call feature, resulting in a lower
rate of interest on the bonds. However, marketability is always reduced if there is a wide spread between the maturity
and the call date.
(5) All bonds callable one or two years before their respective
maturity dates, but in no case less than a year (or preferably longer) after date of issue: this plan may not too adversely affect the terms of sale. If about 10% of the assessments are initially prepaid, such prepayments can be used
to retire bonds in a year or two.
If it should happen that assessments are prepaid in large amounts
before the municipality can exercise the call privilege, it is still
possible to make up at least part of the bond interest which will
run until the call date by investing the amount of the prepayments.9"
The bonds may be sold publicly, upon competitive bidding, or
privately.98 It is impossible to generalize successfully on which
method should be chosen; the decision will depend on market conditions prevailing at the time of sale. If the sale is to be made on
public bidding, it is generally wiser to specify that only sealed bids
will be considered, because possible purchasers who cannot be personally present are reluctant to submit sealed bids, only to present
a target for oral auction bidders to shoot at. The sale notice normally defines the bond denominations, maturities, etc., but leaves
the interest rate and purchase premium open. A sale of the bonds to
the local bank should be avoided, if any member of the council has
a personal financial interest in the bank.99 Whether the sale be public
97. The permitted investments are set forth in § 475.66.
98. § 475.60 (2) exempts bonds payable wholly or partly from special
assessments from the public sale requirements. § 475.60 (4) authorizes the
sale of bonds on public subscription, but this method of sale is practically
never used.
99. § 471.87. The municipal treasurer is usually not a member of the
council. As to villages, see § 412.191 (1). A sale to a bank in which he has an
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or private, § 475.60 (1) requires that the bonds be sold for not less
than par and accrued interest; a discount sale is not permitted.
In municipalities having a municipal liquor store, all or part of
the net revenues of such store may be pledged to the payment of
sewer or water improvement bonds, but the voters must first authorize the pledge at an election.10 0 As previously suggested, this
type of election may be effective beyond its stated legal purpose as a
means of testing voter sentiment on the proposed improvement bond
issue: obviously, any voter who disapproves of the bonds will vote
"no" on the liquor pledge question. The pledge may be in the form
of a stated percentage of the liquor revenues over and above the
cost of operation, or of a minimum dollar amount per annum of
the revenues in excess of such cost. Such a pledge in one sense does
not add very much to the essential security of the bonds, since the
bond holders have a right to payment from any revenues of the
municipality, including those in the liquor fund, 10 1 but the pledge
does accomplish the following: (1) it draws to the attention of
prospective purchasers the fact that the municipality has a profitmaking municipal liquor store; (2) it compels the municipality to
operate the store efficiently; (3) it permits ad valorem taxes to be
levied initially in an amount lower than would be required if the
pledge bad not been made ;102 (4) it gives the taxpayers as well as
the bondholders a right not to have the liquor store profits dissipated on other projects. But in pledging liquor revenues, the municipality cannot promise that the municipal liquor store will be kept
in operation until the bonds are paid, because there is always the
danger that the municipality or the county may, under Chapter
340, vote dry.
For utmost flexibility in financing, it would be useful if the
municipality could pledge the revenues of the municipal system improved, if it is a revenue-producing one, to the payment of the
bonds. There is, however, no statutory or case authority for such a
interest would therefore be proper, as he is not "authorized to take part in
any manner" in the contract selling the bonds, within the language of § 471.87.
Even if the sale is made pursuant to competitive bids, the literal terms of
§§ 471.87-471.89 would prevent sale of the bonds to the lowest bidder, if a
council member had an interest in such bidder. See 35 Minn. L. Rev. 322
(1951). For a discussion of what interests are disqualifying, see 23 Minn. L.
Rev. 239 (1939).

100. § 426.19.
101. As to improvement bonds, § 429.091 (2) provides that in the event
the improvement fund is insufficient, "the council shall pay the principal and
interest out of any fund of the municipality."

102. § 475.61 (1).
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pledge. 10 3 The municipality can certainly annually appropriate sums
from the revenues of the improvement to the improvement fund, as
they are received. 0 To the extent of such annual appropriations,
the municipality may each year cancel the general taxes originally
levied for that year for the improvement fund. 0 5
SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS

I discussed above the fixing by the council of the total amount to
be assessed, in the light of their determination of the benefits, before they proceed to issue bonds. Actually, the council would, in
determining benefits, simultaneously determine what scheme of
assessment should be followed, the benefits and assessments being
so inseparably connected.
As previously stated, the assessments must be based on, and
must not exceed, the benefits received, 00 and must not rely upon a
mistaken rule of assessment. 0 7 But these rules are not enough; the
council must devise a practical formula for the calculation of the
assessment to be made against each property specially benefited. 05
This formula must operate so that the assessment on each property
does not exceed the benefits thereto, and so that the assessments
on all properties are roughly in the same proportion to their respective benefits. 0 9 A number of formulas have received the blessing of
103. § 459.14 (3), by way of contrast, grants such authority for parking
facility improvements. Struble v. Nelson, 217 Minn. 610, 15 N. W. 2d 101
(1944), and the cases cited therein, support the proposition that the mere
power to operate a revenue-producing enterprise implies power to improve it
with bonds payable from its own net revenues. Where express authority to
issue general obligation bonds for such an improvement also exists, it seems
reasonable to suppose that combined general obligation and revenue bonds
may be issued, but there is no case deciding the point. The bond chapter
(Chapter 475) contemplates the possibility of such bonds, in §§ 475.52 (1)
and 475.61 (1), and might perhaps be considered to authorize them expressly.
Some city charters also may provide for such bonds. But Chapter 429 contains no language authorizing the municipality to pledge improvement
revenues to the improvement fund; such a pledge may therefore be unenforceable.
104. Almost all cities and villages are required, under §§ 443.09 and
443.10, to apply sewer revenues in excess of those needed for operation and
maintenance to the payment of bonds and to a reserve for replacements and
obsolescence.
105. § 475.61 (3). This does not permit the cancellation of special
assessments levied for the improvement. Cf. § 443.10, as to sanitary sewer
assessments.
106. See notes 74 and 82 supra.

107. See note 77 supra.

108. Neither the constitution nor the statute lays down any rule or
basis of apportionment. An apportionment according to cash valuation of the
various tracts benefited would be invalid because "unequal". See note 79 supra;
see Noonan v. Stillwater, 33 Minn. 198, 202, 22 N. W. 444, 446 (1885).
109. Under Minn. Const. Art. IX, § 1, special assessments (in the
language of the section) "shall be as nearly equal as may be." Noonan v.
Stillwater, supra note 108.
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the Minnesota Supreme Court, at least where not shown to result in
inequality, including the front-foot method,"10 and an area formula."' As in the determination of benefits, the council performs a
legislative function in the selection of the plan of apportionment
of special assessments," 2 and the fact that a few minor inequities
result from the plan chosen will not lead the court to invalidate the
assessments." 3 But if the inequities become too pronounced, the
court may declare the plan of assessment to be arbitrary.1 4 In view
of the principles and rules just stated, municipalities will usually
find it convenient to apportion assessments by developing as fair
a general formula as possible, and then applying it to all tracts of
land deemed benefited by the improvement, with adjustments in
individual cases.
Once it has decided on a satisfactory assessment formula, the
municipality must see that it is applied only to property which may
lawfully be assessed. This can include, of course, only benefited
property, with the further limitation that it must have been included in "the area proposed to be assessed as stated in the notice
of hearing on the improvement."" 25 Although the chapter is ambiguous on the point, it is usually better practice for the municipality
not to levy an assessment against its own property, but rather to
include the amount which would otherwise be so assessed in the
portion of the cost to be paid by taxes or out of funds on hand." 6
110. State v. District Court, 80 Minn. 293, 83 N. W. 183 (1900) ; State

v. Burnes, 124 Minn. 471, 145 N. W. 377 (1914) ; State v. Ely, 129 Minn. 40,
151 N. W. 545 (1915) ; In re Improvement of Third Street, 185 Minn. 170,
240 N. W. 355 (1932); Quale v. Willmar, 223 Minn. 51, 25 N. W. 2d 699
(1946). In State v. Pillsbury, 82 Minn. 359, 85 N. W. 175 (1901), the court

did not actually condemn the front-foot method per se; it was only a part
of a scheme whereby assessments in excess of the cost of the improvement

were levied. Cf. In re Meyer, 176 Minn. 240, 223 N. W. 135 (1929). State
v. Ely, supra, holds that a variation in the front-foot formula so as to reduce
the assessment for corner lots is valid.

111. Mayer v. Shakopee, 114 Minn. 80, 130 N. W. 77 (1911).
112. Hughes v. Farnsworth, 137 Minn. 295, 163 N. W. 525 (1917) ; In re
Assessment for Paving Concord Street, 148 Minn. 329, 181 N. W. 859 (1921) ;
In re Improvement of Superior Street, 172 I inn. 554, 216 N. W. 318 (1927),
ccrt. denied, 276 U. S.628 (1928) ; Qvale v. Willmar, 223 Minn. 51, 25 N. W.

2d 699 (1946).
113. Compare Mayer v. Shakopee, 114 Minn. 80, 130 N. W. 77 (1911),
with State v. Brill, 58 Minn. 152, 59 N. W. 989 (1894) ; see Noonan v. Stillwater, 33 Minn. 198, 203, 22 N. W. 444, 446 (1885) ; In re Improvement of
Third Street, 185 Minn. 170, 178, 240 N. W. 355, 358 (1932).
114. State v. Judges of Dist. Court, 51 Minn. 539, 53 N. W. 800, 55
N. W. 122 (1892); State v. Brill, supra note 113; It re Improvement of
Third Street, supra note 113.
115. § 429.051.
116. See § 429.061 (1). If the municipality does assess itself, it has to
provide for payment of the assessment by a transfer of moneys on hand or
by levying taxes. Since under § 429.051 such transfer or levy may be made
directly to or for the improvement fund, the assessment is a superfluous in-
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Land owned by the United States and by the state is exempt from
special assessment;117 also, most cemeteries,11s and property of
volunteer fire departments. 1 9 But special assessments may be levied
on land owned by counties and school districts, 12 0 or by religious,
charitable and educational institutions,1 2 1 or by railroads.122

When the assessment roll is ready, the council must call and
hold a public hearing on the assessments, as set forth in § 429.061.123
At the hearing the council "may amend the proposed assessment
as to any parcel."'1 4 Literally, therefore, the council may increase
as well as decrease particular assessments at the hearing, even if
the owners are not present, but it would seem to be better practice,
tervening step. Note that under § 475.61 all taxes needed for payment of the
bonds must be levied once and for all, before the bonds are delivered.
117. Cf. State v. Board of Education, 133 Minn. 386, 158 N. W. 635

(1916); In re Delinquent Real Estate Taxes, Polk County, 182 Minn. 437,
234 N. W. 691 (1931); Independent School Dist. v. White Bear Lake, 208
Minn.29, 292 N. W. 777 (1940).
118. Section 306.14 exempts the lands and properties of non-profit
cemetery associations formed under § 306.01 et seq. from "all public taxes
and assessments." State v. St. Paul, 36 Minn. 529, 32 N. W. 781 (1887) ; St.
Paul v. Oakland Cemetery Ass'n, 134 Minn. 441, 159 N. W. 962 (1916). But
this section does not apply to cemetery corporations organized under other
laws. State v. Crystal Lake Cemetery, 155 Minn. 187, 193 N. W. 170 (1923).
In this opinion, the court expresses doubt (Id. at 192, 193 N. W. at 172) that
corporations organized for pecuniary profit may constitutionally be exempted.
Section 307.09 similarly exempts land dedicated as a private cemetery, by a
private person or a religious corporation. Diocese of St.Paul v. St. Paul, 138
Minn. 67, 163 N. W. 978 (1917).
119. § 272.021.
120. § 435.19. Note that § 429.061 (4) requires special notification to be
given of the levy of assessments on property of a county or school district,
or on a right of way (usually, railroad property).
121. Washburn Memorial Orphan Asylum v. State, 73 Minn. 343, 76
N. W. 204 (1898) ; State v. Trustees of Macalester College, 87 Minn. 165,
91 N. W. 484 (1902); Diocese of St. Paul v. St. Paul, 138 Minn. 67, 163
N. W. 978 (1917).
122. Minnesota Transfer Ry. v. St. Paul, 165 Minn. 8, 205 N. W. 609,
207 N. W. 320 (1923) ; In re Improvement of Superior Street, 172 Minn.
554, 216 N. W. 318 (1927), cert. denied, 276 U. S.628 (1928); Note, 12
Minn. L. Rev. 524 (1928) ; see note 120 supra.
123. The assessment hearing, unlike the hearing on the making of the
improvement, has to do with the constitutional rights of the property-owners.
That is, due process does not require that a property-owner shall be heard on
the question whether the improvement shall be made, but only on the question
whether his assessment exceeds the benefits to his property. This requirement
is met by the assessment hearing plus the opportunity to appeal to the District
Court. But there is no constitutional requirement that such hearing take place
prior to the levy of assessments; the demands of due process are satisfied if
the property-owners have a right at some time to be heard in court, whether
before or after confirmation of the assessment roll, as, for instance, by a
petition under § 278.01 et seq., or in defense to an action for the enforcement
of payment of taxes. County of Hennepin v. Bartleson, 37 Minn. 343, 34 N. IV.
222 (1887) ; Duluth v. Diblee, 62 Minn. 18, 63 N. W. 1117 (1895) ; In re
Delinquent Taxes in Polk County, 147 Minn. 344, 180 N. W. 240 (1920);
State v. Great Northern Ry., 165 Minn. 22, 205 N. W. 612, 207 N. W. 322
(1926).
124. § 429.061 (2).
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due to the constitutional questions involved, not to increase an
assessment without giving notice, either personal or published, and
affording opportunity for hearing to the property-owner. All written and oral objections to the assessments must receive consideration. The usual objections are that the property assessed is not
benefited, or is assessed for more than the amount of the benefit,
but objection may also be made that the proposed assessments are
invalid for lack of compliance with proper procedure, such as failure
to hold the improvement hearing in the manner required,1

25

or to

12 6

Suppose objections
award the improvement contract properly.
of the latter sort, charging lack of compliance with the chapter procedure, are made; what is the council, or the district court on
appeal, to do about them? The answer seems properly to depend
on whether the variances from the prescribed procedure were mere
irregularities not materially affecting the rights of the property
owners.127 However, the Minnesota court has in the past often indicated its feeling that since the imposition of special assessments is
often onerous and borders upon confiscation, the least that it can
do is "insist upon compliance with28 the statute in all matters of detail, in order to levy and collect.1'

1

But suppose, as often happens, a property-owner's objections at
the assessment hearing are overruled, and he does not appeal to the
district court within 20 days after adoption of the assessments, as
§ 429.081 permits him to do; may he thereafter in another proceeding attack the assessment? Section 429.081 provides: "All objections
to the assessment shall be deemed waived unless presented on such
appeal." Even without this sort of statutory declaration, the rule
in Minnesota is well-established that if the law authorizing the
assessment provided the property-owner assessed with a procedure
for attacking it, and he failed to use it, he cannot attack the assessment in other proceedings, except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction to make the assessment. 2 As the court said in In re Assess125. In re Meyer, 158 Minn. 433, 197 N. W. 970, 199 N. W. 745 (1924)
(opinion of Holt, J.). This case also holds that such objection may be made
even if the objector stood by without acting while the improvement was being
made.
126. See County of Hennepin v. Bartleson, 37 Minn. 343, 34 N. W. 222

(1:837).

127. 14 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 38.175 et seq. (3d ed.
1950) ; ef. State v. Blake, 86 M inn. 37, 90 N. W. 5 (1902) ; State v. District
Court, 95 Minn. 70, 103 N. W. 744 (1905).
128. Collins, J., in State v. District Court, 80 Minn. 293, 311, 83 N. W.
183, 189 (1900). See Sewall v. St. Paul, 20 Minn. (Gil. 459, 465) 511 (1874).
129. McKusick v. Stillwater, 44 Minn. 372, 46 N. W. 769 (1890);
Everington v. Board of Park Comm'rs, 119 Minn. 334, 133 N. W. 426 (1912);
A. A. White Townsite Co. v. Moorhead, 120 Minn. 1, 138 N. W. 939 (1912);
County of Rock v. McDowell, 157 Minn. 296, 196 N. W. 178 (1923). In
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ment for Paving Minnehaha Street: "It is clear that municipalities
have an interest in the speedy and final determination of assessment liens. .

. ."

30 Therefore the property-owner who did not ob-

ject at the assessment hearing or did not carry his objections, within 20 days from the hearing, to the district court has lost his day
in court except, it is said, for "jurisdictional" objections. 1 3' Unfortunately, the court has not vouchsafed to us any standard whereby to distinguish "jurisdictional" from other objections.Y32 In a
sense, every step in the improvement-assessment proceeding is
"jurisdictional"; but if this is so, then the rule of the cases would
mean nothing. It seems hardly possible that this exception to the
rule any longer exists, in view of the broad statement in § 429.081
that failure to appeal waives all objections; therefore, nothing prior
to the assessment proceedings can be considered a "jurisdictional"
defect or omission. But in order to have such opportunity to appeal,
the property-owner must of course be given due notice of hearing
and the hearing must be held in accordance with the notice. As a
matter of common sense, therefore, the property-owner cannot subsequently be considered to have waived his objections to his assessment if he can show that he never had a legitimate opportunity to
appeal in the manner required by § 429.081, either because (1) no
Rosso v. Brooklyn Center, 214 Minn. 364, 8 N. W. 2d 219 (1943), where plaintiffs attempted to enjoin the collection of special assessments, the court
sustained demurrers on the ground that they had an adequate remedy at law,
either by the appeal provided by statute from the assessment hearing, or by tax
contest proceedings under §§ 278.01-278.05. In view of the other cases cited
supra, one cannot infer that either remedy was equally available. It is unfortunate that the court did not make clear that the tax contest remedy was
available only for jurisdictional objections. However, the holding of the case,
that the collection of assessments will not be enjoined if the plaintiffs had a
prior adequate remedy at law, is correct. Cf. Schultz v. North Mankato, 176
Minn. 76, 222 N. W. 518 (1928). It is similarly held that if plaintiffs have a
subsequent statutory remedy, they cannot get an injunction against the levy
of assessments. Kelly v. Minneapolis, 57 Minn. 294, 59 N. W. 304 (1894);
Diamond v. Mankato, 89 Minn. 48, 93 N. W. 911 (1903).
130. 170 Minn. 403, 405, 212 N. W. 811, 812 (1927).
131. State v. Bury, 101 Minn. 424, 112 N. W. 534 (1907) ; County of
Rock v. McDowell, 157 Minn. 296, 196 N. W. 178 (1923) ; Freding v. Minneapolis, 177 Minn. 122, 224 N. W. 845 (1929).
132. Objections held jurisdictional: lack of sufficient petition or order
for making improvement: Hawkins v. Horton, 91 Minn. 285, 97 N. W. 1053
(1904), and State v. Bury, supra note 131; improvement contract in excess of
charter debt limit: A. A. White Townsite Co. v.Moorhead, 120 Minn. 1, 138
N. W. 939 (1912) ; failure to give notice of assessment hearing: Sewall v.
St. Paul, 20 Minn. (Gil. 459) 511 (1874), Flint v. Webb, 25 Minn. 93 (1878),
Schultz v. North Mankato, 176 Minn. 76, 222 N. W. 518 (1928) ; failure to
lay service connections before paving, arbitrary choice of materials, and unconstitutionality of the assessment law: Freding v. Minneapolis, SIpra note
131. Objections held not jurisdictional: property not benefited, mistakes in
plans and specifications and in making the assessment: A. A. White Townsite
Co. v. Moorhead, supra; assessment invalid, improper and too high: County
of Rock v. McDowell, 157 Minn. 296, 196 N. W. 178 (1923).
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assessment hearing was held, or no sufficient notice given of the
hearing, or because (2) through fraud or misrepresentation, he was
induced not to present his objections at the hearing, or not to appeal therefrom.
An assessment hearing held in accordance with statute, from
which no appeal is taken, may thus "cure" any infirmities in the
assessments; but suppose objection is taken upon such defects
(more than mere irregularities in procedure or trifling inequities
in the amounts assessed) at the assessment hearing? The council
should declare the assessment invalid, on advice of the municipal
attorney, as provided in § 429.071(2). If it does not, the assessment will be set aside by the district court. In either event, the stage
is set for the council to make a reassessment under § 429.071(2).
The reassessment is not open to attack on the ground of lack of
compliance by the municipality with chapter procedure before the
levy of assessments, even if such lack of compliance was "jurisdictional."'133 Then why bother to take procedural steps required by
the chapter, if a valid reassessment may be made without their
having been taken? Entirely aside from the duty of public officers
to manage public affairs in accordance with law, I believe the following considerations demonstrate why the chapter procedure must
be followed:
(1) The municipality will normally wish to issue the improvement bonds before getting around to the levy of the assessments, and bond purchasers will not accept delivery of the bonds
133. So held in cases involving home rule charter reassessment provisions substantially similar to § 429.071(2) : St. Paul v. Mullen, 27 Minn.
78, 6 N. W. 424 (1880) (illegally let contract) ; State v. District Court, 95
Minn. 183, 103 N. W. 881 (1905) (order authorizing making of improvement

void) ; State v. District Court, 95 Minn. 503, 104 N. W. 553 (1905) ; State v.
District Court, 97 Minn. 147, 106 N. W. 306 (1906) (no petition for the improvement) ; State v. District Court, 98 Minn. 63, 107 N. W. 726 (1906);
State v. District Court, 102 Minn. 482, 113 N. W. 697, 114 N. W. 654 (1907)

(improvement contract void) ; see In re Meyer, 158 Minn. 433, 442, 197 N. W.

970, 199 N. W. 746, 748 (1924) (notice of improvement hearing not published
in accordance with statutory requirements). The Meyer reassessment came

before
the supreme court in It re Meyer, 176 Minn. 240, 223 N. W. 135
(1929).
All the same, one wonders if the reassessment actually goes to the extent

of "vralidating" all prior jurisdictional defects. Probably the theory underlying the reassessment power is that it is fairer that municipalities should be

permitted to assess properties which have benefited from an improvement,
than that the owners of such properties should be unjustly enriched simply
because municipal officials have carelessly or in ignorance failed to comply

with proper procedure, and therefore no valid assessment may be made. If
this theory is correct, then the reassessment cannot be made until the improvement is completed and the reasonable value of the improvement to the property-owners is established, and the amount of the reassessment must be held
within such reasonable value, instead of being limited by the contract cost of
the improvement, which would perhaps be higher.
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unless all preliminaries through the award of the contract have
been observed, as the authority to issue bonds is predicated upon
the due observance of such preliminaries.
(2) Even if the municipality waits to issue bonds until after
the assessment or a reassessment has been made, the bonds may
not be valid to the extent they exceed the total of the assessments (i.e., to the extent they are payable from ad valorem
taxes).
(3) Whether or not bonds are issued, the municipality may
not have authority to levy general taxes or transfer money from
its various funds to pay part of the cost of the improvement.
It may happen, after the assessments have been levied, that due
to unforeseen circumstances the improvement must be abandoned.
In such cases, § 435.20 provides that the special assessments paid
must be refunded, and this is also the rule of the cases, upon the
theory that there has been a failure of consideration and consequently the municipality must make restitution.134 However, this
rule (and the statute) apply only to situations where the improvement fund money was never spent for the intended purpose; if the
situation is instead one where the improvement was merely left incomplete due to lack of sufficient funds, or where it proved not to
benefit the property assessed because it was improperly carried out,
the rule (in the absence of statute) is that the property-owners
assessed may not recover the assessments they paid."'
Normally the assessment hearing will be held before the improvement has been completely paid for; so, unless someone has
committed a gross error, it will be impossible to prove at the hearing that the assessment is greater in amount than the cost of the
improvement. But after final settlement of the accounts of the improvement, it may become evident that its cost is actually less than
the amount of the assessment. While this situation is rare, occurring only when the council has purported to assess all or substantially all of the cost, it presents a difficult problem, because § 435.20
imposes some duty on the council to refund the excess of the assess134. Valentine v. St. Paul, 34 Minn. 446, 26 N. W. 457 (1886) ; Strickland v. Stillwater, 63 Minn. 43, 65 N. W. 131 (1895) ; McConville v. St. Paul,
75 Minn. 383, 77 N. W. 993 (1889); see Germania Bank v. St. Paul, 79
Minn. 29, 33, 81 N. W. 542, 542-543 (1900). It appears from § 435.20 that
the municipality is obliged to make the refund only if the owner applies

for it.

135.

Rogers v. St. Paul, 79 Minn. 5, 81 N. W. 539, 47 L. R. A. 537

(1900) ; see McConville v. St. Paul, 75 Minn. 383, 389, 77 N. W. 993 (1899)

(dissenting opinion); Germania Bank v. St. Paul, 79 Minn. 29, 34, 81 N. W.
542, 542-543 (1900) ; 13 Minn. L. Rev. 631 (1929).

ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE

ment over the actual cost, but it is almost hopelessly ambiguous in
meaning. 36 This section of the statutes emphatically needs to be
37
replaced.2
CONCLUSION

Although the subject of special assessment financing is a fairly
recondite legal specialty, it is interesting to see how many court
decisions there are in this limited field, and how at every legislative
session new laws affecting it are enacted. Since this branch of the
law is not a "live" one (in the law-review sense of the word), one
must conclude that special assessment financing of local improvements has been very common, and will continue to be widely used.
One must also conclude, from the fact that in many, if not most of
the cases, the amount involved was relatively small, that the imposition of special assessments is very apt to excite popular apprehensions of injustice. To protect itself, the municipality must make
sure that it has in all respects complied with applicable statutory
provisions and interpretations.
136. For instance:
(1) When must the refund be made:
(a) as soon as the actual cost is known (i.e., the work has
been done)? If so, may the excess unpaid assessments

be cancelled, or must a portion of the assessments so far
paid be refunded?
(b) upon completion of collection of all installments of assessments, when the actual cost including interest on
money borrowed and loss of delinquent assessments is
known?
(2) Who is entitled to refund: the owner of the property at the
time of the assessment, the owners at the various times when
installments were paid, or the owner at the time of refund?
137. Although not discussed in this Article, mention should be made of
the useful provisions of § 429.101 for imposing special assessments to pay the
cost of weed control and certain street and sidewalk maintenance expenses.

